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might have been a Reception, though how clear and present a danger
there actually was can only be conjectured. Had a ninth Henry suc-
ceeded the eighth in 1547, instead of a boy and his two sisters, then
those saviors of England's public law and constitutional government-
the Inns of Court, the common lawyers, and the parliament-men-
might have found themselves too late to cope with a prince's arbitrary
will.
Doubt may remain about what the Inns of Court saved English law
from; but there was none in Maitland's mind about what they saved
it for. The Rede Lecture concluded with a dashing five-page finale
that ranged from Coke's "first charter of Virginia" to John Marshall
and "straight to the Pacific," from Baltimore and Australia to those
"detached members of the manor of East Greenwich in the county of
Kent," Bombay and Prince Rupert's land, and so to "a country village"
in Connecticut where James Kent, the future chancellor, retired in
1779 and at the age of fifteen read "the four volumes" of Blackstone
upon the breaking up by the war of Yale College.30
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The revival of jurisprudence enjoys a notable position in the "Re-
naissance of the Twelfth Century" envisioned by Charles Homer
Haskins a generation ago.' At the center of the new legal learning
was the study of Roman Law, in particular the Corpus luris Civilis.
The greatest body of law ever compiled in the West, which had once
governed the most powerful state that had ever ruled in the West, was
presented virtually de novo in a complete and codified form for the
edification of educated men in a congeries of European countries just
beginning to assume statehood. Each country had its customary law
already, of course, but as a means of defining the public authority of a
strong central government and of regulating the private legal rela-
tions of an urbanized society, the coutumiers were as toys compared
30. MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 31-32, 94-95.
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to the Corpus Juris Civilis. Inevitably, in these circumstances, Roman
Law influenced the public or private law (or both) of all European
countries, at least as early as the last decades of the tvelfth century.
The problem is to understand in just what respects and to what degree
Roman Law affected each country. England was the country least
affected by Roman Law, and the scholars of English legal and consti-
tutional history have usually been reluctant to assign much importance
to Roman Law even where its operation in England is indisputable.
In every instance, it seems, scholars can find some feature of older
English law which suffices to explain a crucial development, so that
knowledge of Roman Law has not been a scholarly prerequisite for
the English historian.
The foregoing synopsis suggests the major and the minor themes of
Gaines Post's Studies in Medieval Legal Thought. The major theme
is the way in which Roman Law affected medieval Europe as a whole;
that is, how it contributed to the rise of representative institutions, and
how it influenced the development of the idea of the State. The minor
theme is Post's battle of wits with those scholars of English history
who resist the notion of Roman Law influence, whether on the devel-
opment of Parliament, the notion of the State, or most anything else.
Thirty years of study and writing are brought together in these
essays. Two phases of Post's intellectual interests are represented, and
they are made clear by the organization of the book. Part I, "Corporate
Community, Representation, and Consent," consists of four essays
published between 1934 and 1946. In sum, they show how certain
judicial procedures in Romano-Canonical law were adapted to secular
institutions, and in particular to nascent parliaments. Part II, "Public
Law and the State," consists of seven studies written between 1953
and 1964, most of them after 1960. They deal with the question of how
far legal philosophy had arrived at a definition of the State by the
1320's. The first set of essays can be classified under the history of
institutions; the second set, under the history of ideas. The first set
includes the most famous of Post's writings, those on Quod omnes
tangit and on Plena potestas. The second set is cast on a more philo-
sophical plane, and ultimately should have wider appeal because it
deals with a broader subject, the rise of the national State.
Reviewing Post's Studies for any other kind of journal than this, it
might be better to pass flittingly over the oldest of the essays in Part I,
an article of 1984 entitled "Parisian Masters as a Corporation." The
readers of this journal, however, might find it among the most inter-
esting. In it, Post takes legal instruments and court decisions of the
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late 1100's and early 1200's and shows us how one group, the "corpora-
tion of masters" of the University of Paris, acquired legal existence.
The pivotal questions are these: when did the University begin to have
a procurator who could act for it in the courts? When did it come to
possess its own (or to use someone else's) "authentic seal" to validate
its mandates? Post concludes that the corporation of Parisian masters-
whether called a corpus, universitas, collegium, communitas, societas,
or schola-had status as a juristic personage by the year 1215 at the
latest. No single charter tells us this. It is discoverable only by master-
ing the shifting nomenclature of legal instruments and by sensing the
moment when the corporate nature and the corporate rights of the
masters were indubitably and irreversibly attained in the eyes of the
courts-and what more cautious proponents could one want than the
judges? This occurred almost two decades before the University of
Paris was "constituted" by papal charters.
Proctorial representation lent itself naturally to the development of
the theory of corporations in private law, but its application to the new
institutions of governance in public law may be considered sui generis.
In terms of political representation, the problem is to explain the differ-
ence between feudal and modern assemblies. Historically, Italy and
Spain are often said to have had many different kinds of people attend-
ing assemblies as early as the twelfth century, putting them much in
advance of kingdoms such as England and France where the court of
the king (curia regis) was attended only by feudatories.2 The Italian
and Spanish "representatives," however, were usually very important
personages in the realm and thus represented personal more than
corporative interests. The consensus they gave to royal actions was more
like acclamation than true consent. The representatives of the cities,
if any, were usually magistrates who gave counsel to the king when
requested and, naturally, strove to preserve local privileges; moreover,
they had no established role in the consensus. In contrast to these
q'representatives," Post describes those who attended assemblies in the
following century, the thirteenth. Romano-canonical juristic terminol.
ogy had become common, and central governments were steadily adapt-
ing the mechanism of the proctor's power to the role of a person
representing a collective group. Just as the proctor could represent
corporate interests in a courtroom, so the delegates of cities represented
a whole segment of citizenry. The number of representatives became
2. I am summarizing here "Roman Law and Early Representation in Spain and Italy,
1150-1250," which is Post's Chapter II.
[Vol. 75:10591066
REVIEWS
fixed. Each one acted on behalf of a corporate body which had given
him full powers, rather than out of his personal or private interest.
In Italy and Spain, cities were represented early because great
political power resided in them by the twelfth century. The basis of
representation there changed as the proctorial mechanism became
common. In England, however, the feudal curia regis was almost two
centuries old before the towns were represented at its meetings. This
happened at about the same time, just after 1250, that proctorial rep-
resentation became characteristic of assemblies on the continent. More-
over, Roman Law formulae are to be found in the summonses to Par-
liament in England concurrently with the first appearances of delegates
from towns. Post draws our attention to one formula in particular,
which is found in England as well as upon the continent: quod omnes
tangit.3 "What touches all should be approved by all" (quod omnes
similiter tangit ab omnibus comprobetur) is a good enough motto to
stand for representative government wherever it has existed. So perfect
is it as a motto, some have argued, that its roots in private law proce-
dure of the Roman Law are no more than an antiquarian's delight.
The necessity for all subjects to be represented in Parliament can be
shown by specific national conditions; the use of a Roman Law expres-
sion when composing the summonses to Parliament could have been
just a chancery clerk's inspiration which became a vogue and then a
principle for Englishmen's own good reasons. This is a slightly bizarre
form of the traditional attitude of English constitutional historians with
which Gaines Post has had to cope.
Quod omnes tangit can be found in several places in the Corpus
luris Civilis. The classical verbal formulation, as quoted in the previous
paragraph, is from Codex 5.59.5.2, where it refers to the joint interest
of co-tutors. More important for the development of procedural con-
sent in medieval legal and political practice, however, were the rules set
forth in Digest 42.1.47, regarding the cases that came before the praetor
in charge of the imperial fiscus: everyone touched by a suit should be
present at the adjudication, but even those absent would fall under
the judgment by default as long as they had been properly summoned.
In the medieval legist's writings, the interplay between these passages,
and between them" and others like them, might result in the emphasis
falling upon the summons ("all who are touched are to be called") or
upon the consent ("it is necessary to have the consent of all those
whom the matter touches").
S. Chapter IV, "A Romano-Canonical Maxim, Quod Ornnes Tangit. in Bracton and in
Early Parliaments."
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Quod omnes tangit found early expression in legal practices of the
Church, both in ecclesiastical courts and in the calling of synods and
councils. In secular law it is obvious how quod omnes tangit principles
would be adopted for court procedure in any region disposed by tradi-
tion to follow Roman Law, but the important issue is how and to what
degree it applied to representative assemblies. Corporative representa-
tion in political assemblies was an entirely new principle that evolved
in western Europe in the High Middle Ages.
The formula of quod omnes tangit appeared verbatim in the sum-
monses to the Model Parliament in 1295, but some of its phraseology
was used in summonses at an even earlier date. Gaines Post's approach
to the problem is not primarily in terms of these documents, however,
but rather in terms of the writings of Henry of Bracton (d. 1268), the
foremost English jurist of the thirteenth century. From Bracton, Post
cites a score of examples of quod omnes tangit terminology used to
explain procedural consent. Bracton undoubtedly derived his knowl-
edge directly from Roman Law or from contemporary commentators
upon it such as Azo. If Bracton was imbued with the terminology,
realized fully its legal application, and adapted it to English practice,
much of the ground is cut out from under those who would like to
believe the "chancery clerk's whim" hypothesis. Doubt could be raised
whether Bracton's use of quod omnes tangit to explicate civil matters
provided a basis for its use in summonses to a political assembly. But
in England no distinction existed between public law and private law,
so that we may safely say: "once in Bracton, then easily in summonses
to Parliament."
Plena potestas is the sibling of quod omnes tangit as far as parentage
is concerned (Roman Law), and its necessary companion in the proper
functioning of representative institutions. It is one thing for the central
authority to summon all to be present who are touched by a certain
matter, and another to have each one who does come have full power
(plena potestas) to represent a whole city or region.4
Plena potestas, which derived chiefly from the mandate given the
proctor when representing a client in court, grew rapidly in importance
in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the same ecclesiastical
and secular courts as quod omnes tangit. It also applied to the functions
of administrative agents and ambassadors (whence "plenipotentiaries"),
whose status was equal and whose negotiations were not regulated by
the rules of a court. But when delegates came to Parliament possessing
4. Chapter HI, "Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies. A Study In
Romano-Canonical Procedure and the Rise of Representation, 1150-1325."
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plena potestas to represent some corporative body in the realm, they
were not on an equal footing with the king; the king called the assembly
by his fiat, and his demands had to be met. True, he had to be able to
defend his actions in terms of the common good, the public welfare,
the status regis et regni, or the like, and his demands could be negotiated
and perhaps even tapered down. Still, in England the royal prerogative
remained supreme, and it is not feasible to maintain that the theory
of parliamentary sovereignty which finally emerged was based upon
the "full power" which subjects gave to their delegates. Gaines Post is
cautious on this point, but insists that the machinery of representation
still owes much to Roman Law principles.
"Public Law and the State," the second and largest part of Post's
Studies, consists of his most recent writings. He uses the same sources
and evidence as in the first part-the dicta of medieval lawyers and
jurists-but the problem is basically different At issue now is the legal
conception of the nature and the power of the State. Post tackles this
from a half-dozen different points of view, some technical and some
philosophical. The essential conclusion, however, is always the same:
nothing is lacking in the legal philosophy of the thirteenth century
to prevent us from saying that the State (as we now use the term)
existed at that time.
Much of Post's case rests upon the use of the Latin word status in the
language of the law. The word status had manifold meanings in classical
and medieval Latin, as does "state" in English (e.g., condition, situation,
status, estate), but the political and legal meaning of status in ancient
and medieval times is hardly comparable to what is contained in the
modem word State (or 0~tat, Stato, Staat, etc.). Our modern word has
a degree of abstraction, and embraces notions of territorial preciseness
and sovereign power which are lacking in the old Latin usage of status.
While status could be used in political contexts, it was simply not the
generic term we are now familiar with.
Medieval Lati4 had no word which could stand alone to designate
the State.5 There were instead many words, and three of them were used
most often: Respublica, civitas, and regnum. That is to say, kinds of
states were designated. The intriguing thing is that status could be used
in conjunction with all of these (and with others as well), in the terms
status Reipublicae, status civitatis, and status regni. Status, in these
5. Politia (our "polity') is a possible exception, for it could be used as Aristotle used
it to designate "constitution" generally. This would have been common, however, only
after 1260 when a Latin translation of the Politics became available; besides, politia
could cause confusion because it was also Aristotle's word to describe one kind of govern-
ment, the rule of the many for the good of all.
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contexts, should be translated as the "public welfare" or the "govern-
ance" of the Republic, of the city, or of the kingdom. Status finally be-
came a generic term, especially in its vernacular derivatives. All the
stages in the evolution of the word have still not been clearly shown.
Some instances of the vernacular "state" used alone can be found in
the fourteenth century, but only in the sixteenth century was it estab-
lished usage. Historians of the modern era find this quite appropriate,
because they do not believe that the idea of the abstract State is older
than the Renaissance. Gaines Post, on the other hand, believes that
during the first two centuries of the renewed study of Roman Law, the
medieval lawyers constructed a complete doctrine of the competence
of public authority. They were stimulated by the conception of the
Roman state embodied in the Roman Law, but they translated it into
terms of contemporary institutions.
One almost wishes that the philological problem of how the word
status evolved into State were not involved. It confounds the issue
because the reader wonders whether Post is not investing the thirteenth
century use of status with too much of a modern meaning, rather than
concentrating upon the legal conceptions and the institutions to show
that no matter what terminology was used the idea of sovereign public
authority existed. Those who are ill at ease with the philological method
will often be unhappy, and I do not deny that in some cases they may
be justified. To these critics, however, several replies can be made.
For one thing, it is important to know the history of the word "State"
as well as to understand the growth of the institution. Secondly, if the
word status crops up constantly in juridical and official writings dealing
with public authority, a full picture cannot be presented by avoiding the
word. Finally, although it may be thought unwise repeatedly to organize
the arguments in terms of key phrases involving the word status, the
author has not simply collected and sorted them out as a lexicographer
might have done. He is always interested in understanding the histor-
ical context. In summary, I might offer the following subtitle to the
essays on "Public Law and the State":
How, by studying the contexts in which the word status is used in
legal writings and official documents from the twelfth century to
the early fourteenth, one can discover that the juridical aspect of
public authority was as clearly defined as it is in the modern State.
No detailed summary of Post's essays on the State is here attempted.
We must take cognizance, however, of one key text. Ulpian, in the
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opening lines of the Digest, makes his famous distinction between
Public Law and Private Law. In close succession he says:0
Public Law is that which regards the status rei Romanae ...
Public Law is concerned with sacred rites, with priests, with
magistrates.
Most medieval glossators and commentators defined the words status
rei Romanae as the "public utility" or "public welfare." Some, how-
ever, put together the two predicates of Public Law in the two sentences
above, and equated status with magistracy, or with public authority in
general.7 In this way, status came to be associated with institutions of
governance. When applied to the medieval king or kingdom, status
was used in phrases which denoted the newly appearing concepts of
public authority, such as the royal dignity, or the crown; or it was
applied to new agencies of governance such as the household of the king.
The latter is a good example of the intricacy of the problem. The
household of the king was originally a group of personal retainers,
an aspect of feudal society; in time many of these retainers became
"crown officers" (e.g., the Chancellor and the Constable) and heads of
permanent juridical or administrative agencies of government. They
moved from private to public service, as it were, and this exemplifies
the transition from feudal to modern government. We can see what
happened over the centuries, but the specific stages in the transition
are not easy to isolate.
The Statute of York of 1322 is one of the capital documents of
English constitutional history. To know the meaning of its phrases
using the words community, king and crown, is to have a fair conception
of the social and legal divisions of the time. In the legal French of the
Statute, "state" appears in four different terms: lestat du roiaulme, lestat
du roi, lestat del hostel and lestat de la coronne. To understand what
they refer to, Gaines Post has marshalled his arguments in terms of the
Latin phrases status regis and status regnis The legists by the end of
the thirteenth century had defined the status of the king or of the
kingdom as matters of justice, taxation and war. The status ap-
proximated the majesty of the king, the dignity of the royal office, the
rights of the crown. In sum, it clearly delineates the public aspect of
6. DIGM 1.1.1.2.
7. See Chapter VII, "Status, Id Est, Magistratus: L'Etat, C'est Moi"; Chapter V, Ratio
Publicae Utilitatis, Ratio Status, and 'Reason of State,' 1100-1300."
8. Chapter VI, "Status Regni: Lestat du Roiuhne in the Statute of York, 1322," and
Chapter VIII, "Status Regis: Lestat du Roi in the Statute of York."
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rulership. It is in this light that we should analyze lestat du roi, lestat du
roiaulme and the other phrases in the Statute of York. English common
law may not have entertained a distinction between public and private
law, but the Roman Law form of this distinction had been made
operable in terms of medieval institutions. The Statute of York reveals
that the public-or, if you will, political-aspects of rulership were
clearly separated from the person of the ruler.
There comes to mind here the notable work of the late Ernst H.
Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies.0 In England, in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries, the lawyers evolved a doctrine differentiating
between the body natural of the king and the body politic of the King.
Kantorowicz shows how this formulation was peculiar to the English,
although the idea existed in analogous forms in almost every medieval
monarchy. In the Statute of York, if Post is correct, the English had
the notion of the "king's two bodies" in the early fourteenth century.
When dealing with the Statute of York, Post again engaged himself
with English constitutional historians regarding the influence of Roman
Law. The main thrust of his essays on the State, however, is against
those who hold that the modem state came into being only during the
Renaissance. The exemplar of that school of thought is Friedrich
Meinecke, who took Machiavelli as the point of departure.1 0 "Reason
of State," according to Meinecke, had several antecedents in the late
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries and he singles out as his two
earliest examples Philip of Leyden and Jean Gerson. The former spoke
of the ruler being allowed to revoke a privilege he had given if it was
injurious to the publica utilitas, and the latter enunciated the principle
that necessitas legem non habet. This "new conception of necessity of
State" belongs to Meinecke's scheme of "Reason of State." If this be
true, Gaines Post asserts, then Reason of State existed in the twelfth
century. "Necessity has no Law" appears in Gratian's Decretum in the
twelfth century-in fact it is much older-and the justification of acts
done "by reason of public utility" is found throughout the writings of
the medieval legists.11
In the long essay on ratio status, Post relentlessly drives home the
point that the doctrine of public law espoused by his legists allows the
9. KANTOROIVICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1957). Kantorowicz borrowed from Post's
early writings for The King's Two Bodies, and repaid the debt by what this work con.
tributed to Post's later writings. They were good friends, and their works, so different
in approach and even in methodology, are complementary.
10. MEINECKE, DIE IDEE DER STAATSRAON IN DER NEUEREN G-ScIIICIITE (1924).




ruler virtual freedom of action where preservation of the status is
concerned. Post makes dear in this section that historians of political
thought have neglected the writings of the lawyers. Revision is certainly
called for. Meinecke's thesis is not shattered, nor must its base in
Machiavelli be abandoned; but what is peculiar to the Renaissance
doctrine of Reason of State must be restated. The juridical principles,
it turns out, are as old as the hills.12
The response to Post's challenge might begin by questioning his
constant references to ratio in the nominative case, ratio publicae
utilitatis, where his texts invariably use it in the Ablative of Manner,
ratione publicae utilitatis. Ratione, "by reason of," is hardly more than
"because of"; it does not carry the connotation of faculty of the mind
(of the ruler) which is embodied in the modern notion of Reason of
State. The idea of necessity is present in medieval thought, but it
operates only in extraordinary circumstances. In Meinecke's Reason
of State, necessity comes into play not just in emergencies but as a
daily rational calculation by the ruler of the means he must employ to
enhance the power of the State. Behind this distinction lies a difference
in premises. The medieval juridical conception of the State assumes
that a tranquil, ordered society can exist; the modem conception of
the State is as much political as juridical, and accepts struggle and
change as normal conditions.
Gaines Post is quite aware of this kind of distinction. There is, for
example, an emotionalism in popular feeling for the State today which
did not exist in the Middle Ages. The State is not now regarded by
many as part of a divinely ordered universe, but such was the concep-
don of most people in the Middle Ages. Yet even these things are not
left unchallenged by Post. He has an essay on patriotism in medieval
legal thought, which all students of the concept of nationalism would
do well to read.13 The final chapter of the book, appearing in print
for the first time,' 4 faces the most serious philosophical objection to
comparing the medieval idea of the State with the modem one: does
12. I am reminded of J. W. ALuTO, HzrroRy or PoLrcA. Tioucirr .N TnE Sn-rmw ,-
CEscrUy (1928), another notable work, where some of the stock phrases about ro)al pow'er
used for centuries by the lawyers are presented as new coinage of "absolutist" writers.
13. Chapter X, "Public Law, the State, and Nationalism."
14. Chapter XI, "The Naturalness of Sodety and the State." To complete the mention
of the chapters of Post's book in my footnotes, I must add "The Roman Law and the
'Inalienability Clause' in the English Coronation Oath," a new essay where (if I am not
mistaken) a host of scholars who have written upon inalienability of lands and rights
possessed by medieval secular and ecclesiastical dignities will find, red-facedly, that the
principle of it is manifest in the Corpus Iuris Civilis.
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the former, like the latter, have the notion of the State as an end unto
itself? Was it regarded as "natural"? Political philosophers have estab-
lished the appearance in Latin of Aristotle's Politics, in 1260, as the
only safe terminus a quo for the growth of the idea of the naturalness
of political life, derived from the premise that man is by nature sociable.
Again, Post finds, the Corpus luris Civilis has been overlooked. Con-
sider the definitions of ius naturale and ius gentium which Ulpian set
forth in the opening of the Digest:5
Natural law is that which all animals have been taught by nature;
this law is not peculiar to the human species, it is common to all
animals.
The law of peoples is the law used by the various tribes of mankind,
and.., is... common to human beings in respect of their mutual
relations.
In the glosses upon these texts, the legists ranked the ius gentium as
a kind of ius naturale, a natural law which is common to all men but
not to all animals. God's role never lacks, to be sure, for nature is his
instrument (natura, id est, deus ran the formula), but once said, specula-
tion may continue within Ulpian's secular framework.
Even if the State was regarded as natural by the medieval legists, we
must still enquire whether Nature itself was viewed as the permanent
and unchanging order of things, or was thought of as incessantly
changing. If unchanging (summa natura), the State (as suggested above)
seeks tranquillity and order; if changing (natura varia), the State
assumes a dynamic character. The former is medieval, the latter mod-
em; surely this way of defining the medieval and modem State is not
perturbed by the Roman Law. Yet it is, or may have been. Gaines Post
points to some very interesting lines in Justinian's Preface to the Codex
regarding the varia rerum natura, but another passage by Justinian,
from his preface to the Digest, is just as provocative: 1
Now whatever is divine is absolutely perfect, but the character
of human law is to be constantly hurrying on, and no part of it
is there which can abide forever, as nature is ever eager to produce
new forms, so that we fully anticipate that emergencies may here-
after arise which are not enclosed in the bonds of legal rules.
A more complete theory of legislation is to be found in this passage
15. DIGESr 1.1.1.3 & 4.
16. Constitutio Tanta, § 18, which is given in modem editions of the Corpus lIurs
Civilis as a preface to the Digest. It is as good as, but no better than, the similar passages
quoted by Post in respect to "new forms."
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than we are wont to allow existed in the Middle Ages. We think of the
medieval king as typically roi justicier: eyes on the past, maintaining
established laws; while the modern ruler is roi legislateur: eyeing the
future and trying to control it by formulating new laws. Even this old
saw has to be qualified.
One problem raised by Post's theory of the State should trouble both
medieval and modem historians. If, as he argues, the legal basis of the
State was fully developed in the minds of legists around 1300, and yet
the theory of the State did not become the subject of lively polemics
until around 1500, what must we then say about the interim period?
The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries have recently become a kind of
no man's land between medievalists and modernists. Excluding the cul-
ture of early Renaissance Italy from consideration, medievalists today
shun the Later Middle Ages as a decline from the peak achieved in
1300, while the modernists only reluctantly want to add them to their
baggage. Post makes remarks relevant to this issue. "After the thirteenth
century the private rights of the nobility... frequently triumphed over
the public law and the ideal of the State as the natural end of all mem-
bers in common," he says,' 7 and he refers to "the failures of the public
order of the State and of the public authority of the king in the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries."' 8
Paradoxically, Post has called upon us to embrace the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries in the ken of our theory of the modem State, and
yet he acknowledges that the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries mark
a rupture in that theory. The answer would seem to be that theory
outstripped practice, so that the legal conception of the State held by
1300 was not embodied in institutions until after 1500. But what was
finally realized institutionally in fact owes a vast debt to the legal
thought of "the great medieval renaissance of the tiwelfth and thirteenth
centuries." These words, with which the book ends, evoke the memory
of Charles Homer Haskins. Gaines Post's work is worthy of that great
man, who was his teacher.
RALPH E. GiEsEY-
17. P. 507.
18. P. 23, n.12.
t Professor of History, University of Iowa.
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